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11. IS THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT REALLY 
COMPREHENSIVE?
Emilio Barucci1, Roberto Baviera1 and Carlo Milani2
Abstract
The Comprehensive Assessment is the first action taken by the European Central
Bank as supervisor of the banking sector in the euro area according to the Single
Supervisory Mechanism. The key question relies on whether the exercise was
truly comprehensive or not. The database, made available by the central bank and
the European Banking Authority, allows to verify for the possibility of double
standards with respect to banks’ business models (traditional credit activity
versus financial assets) and to their country of origin. Answers are surprising on
both aspects.
11.1. INTRODUCTION
A few days before the start of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, on the 26th of
October 2014, the results of the Comprehensive Assessment (CA) were released:
CA can be considered the true kick off of the European Banking Union. CA was
performed by the European Central Bank (ECB), in collaboration with the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA) and the national competent authorities, in order
to check financial health of the banks that ECB would have supervised within few
days.
Two were the main tasks of the CA: i) it tried to define a level playing field in the
euro-area banking sector, harmonizing the different national approaches to
supervision, and ii) it sought for an adequate level of capitalization for European
banks assessing their main risks. These two tasks were addressed through two
‘exercises’ that complement each other: the Asset Quality Review (AQR) which
was focused more on the first task and a Stress Test (ST) analysis, tuned more on
the second task. In the ST there were a baseline scenario and an adverse scenario,
where the baseline scenario was derived from the (country specific) European
Commission’s three year forecasts while the adverse scenario was a downward
perturbation of the baseline.
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While ST can be considered nowadays a ‘standard’ methodology for the banking
sector in both in USA and Europe, the AQR was a detailed analysis of a selection
of banks portfolios with the explicit mandate of harmonization on both tradi-
tional credit activity (e.g. the definition of non-performing exposure, impairment
triggers, provisioning approaches for going concern non-performing exposures
and point-in-time collective provisioning) and financial assets (mainly on the
valuation methodologies of the most complex financial assets in a bank’s balance
sheet – i.e. level 3 assets – and on CVA – credit value adjustment – calculation).
The AQR led to EUR 48 billion (bn) of adjustments to bank assets, while the
capital adjustment related to the adverse ST scenario was EUR 263 bn, a median
4% reduction in the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio (ECB, 2014).
Due to the relevance and novelty of the exercise in the euro area, several are the
relevant questions that could be addressed. In this short contribution we just aim
to identify whether the exercise was truly comprehensive and we verify for the
possibility of double standards with respect to banks’ business models and to
their country of origin. For broader questions as the capability of the CA to
capture bank risk we refer to Acharya and Steffen (2014) and Barucci et al.
(2016).
In order to achieve this objective, we investigate the determinants of the capital
shortfall of a bank, considering two different measures: i) shortfall with respect
to the AQR and ii) shortfall after the CA. The latter is obtained as the maximum
of the three shortfalls (AQR and two ST scenarios) and it amounts to
EUR 24.6 bn for 25 banks (ECB, 2014). As explanatory variables, we include
country and balance sheet variables.
Our main findings are as follows: a) the assessment was biased against banks
specializing in traditional activity; b) the leverage ratio performs better than the
risk-weighted capital ratio, i.e. the CET1 ratio, in capturing the shortfall of the
CA; c) the shortfall seems to depend on the country where the banking group is
incorporated.
Even a purely descriptive analysis shows that the AQR exercise concentrated
predominantly on traditional credit activity rather than on the financial assets
detained by banks: only EUR 1.4 bn of the AQR adjustments were due to asset
evaluation adjustments, EUR 3.1 bn came from the revision of CVA values while
EUR 43 bn came from credit adjustments (ECB, 2014). Our analysis confirms
this observation: the AQR shortfall and the CA shortfall are positively affected
by the role of credit activity but they are not influenced by the presence of the
financial assets, even those extremely difficult to evaluate (level 3 assets).
Our analysis sheds some light on the banking capital debate. As expected, the
AQR shortfall is negatively affected by the CET1 ratio and by the leverage ratio.
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However, we show that the CA shortfall is affected by the leverage ratio, whereas
the CET1 ratio does not play any explanatory role. This view reinforces the scep-
ticism concerning the reliability of risk-weighted capital ratios following the
financial crisis (for European stress tests in 2011 and in 2014, see e.g. Acharya et
al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2014; Haldane, 2012; Le Leslé and Avramova,
2012).
Furthermore, our results show some evidence that the CA shortfall depends on
the country in which the bank group is incorporated: banks located in peripheral
countries are penalized in comparison to those of core countries.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the empirical model and we present our main results, both on the AQR shortfall
and on the shortfall of the CA as a whole. In Section 3 we conclude and underline
some policy implications.
11.2. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
We analyse bank-level data from the ECB and the EBA, with respect to shortfalls
after the AQR and the ST. The CA involved 130 banks for the AQR with total
assets of EUR 22 trillion (tr) and risk-weighted assets (RWAs) of EUR 8.5 tr,
which account for 81.6% of the banking system under the umbrella of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism. The AQR focused on bank assets as at the end of 2013,
while the ST performed a scenario analysis on a three-year window up to 2016.
Our sample is made up of 129 banks operating in the euro area3.
The gross domestic product (GDP) figures are 2013 values from the World Bank
database.
Our research strategy is to estimate the shortfall of a bank associated with the
AQR and with the CA (maximum of the shortfalls of the AQR, of the ST under
the baseline scenario and of the ST under the adverse scenario). We refer respec-
tively to the two shortfalls as SF_AQR and SF_CA. The capital shortfalls are
obtained as the absolute value of the differences (floored at zero) between the
CET1 ratio obtained after the AQR or the ST and the associated thresholds (8%
for the AQR, 8% in 2016 post ST under the baseline scenario and 5.5% in 2016
post ST under the adverse scenario).
3 We omit data from Deutsche Bank Malta because of the abnormal CET1 ratio (281%).
SUERF2016_3.book  Page 97  Thursday, June 30, 2016  10:01 AM
98 THE SSM AT 1
l a r c i e r
We consider the following reference model:
(1)
where  denotes either the AQR or CA shortfalls of bank i, expressed in
EUR bn. In the model we include two types of exogenous variables: bank-specific
variables (lower case i) and a country specific variable (lower case j) that refers to
the country in which the bank holding company is located.
We control for the size of the bank using the logarithm of total assets (lasset) and
we allow for nonlinearities by also including the square of this variable (lasset2).
The size of the balance sheet size could provide a control variable for the level of
the shortfall for several reasons: on the one hand, a large bank is more likely to
be supervised by the market and therefore the need for intervention from the
supervisory authority could be less intense; on the other hand, a large bank is
riskier from a systemic risk perspective, thus potentially making supervision
softer or tougher. To investigate further how the bank’s relevance affects the CA
exercise, we also consider the ratio of the assets of the bank over the nominal
GDP of the country in which the bank is incorporated (sys). This ratio should
explicitly capture the systemic relevance associated with a bank in terms of the
relationship between size and systemic risk (see e.g. Laeven et al., 2014).
There is a still open debate on the appropriate capital ratio (risk-adjusted versus
non-risk-adjusted) that should be considered in order to capture the riskiness of
a bank’s balance sheet. This debate leads us to introduce as capital ratio (cap)
either the CET1 ratio (cet1) or the leverage ratio (lr)4. If a capital ratio is a reliable
indicator of the bank’s solidity, it should have a negative effect on the size of the
shortfall for the AQR and for the CA as a whole. Note that the shortfall is defined
with respect to CET1 thresholds and thus (in an obvious way) a lower shortfall
should be associated with a higher CET1 ratio as a starting point (both for the
AQR and for the CA as a whole).
We investigate how the composition of the balance sheet affects the shortfall. To
capture how credit quality affects the shortfall of the AQR and of the CA, we
consider the ratio of non-performing exposures over total exposures (npe) and
the coverage ratio for non-performing exposures (cr), i.e. the ratio between credit
loss provision funds and non-performing exposures. As far as the asset compo-
nent is concerned, we consider the proportion of level 3 assets to total assets
(level3).
4 The leverage ratio is computed as CET1 capital over total assets and measured according to the Capital
Requirements Regulation under the Capital Requirements Directive.
SF_Yi k β1 capi β2 lasseti β3 lasseti2 β4 npei β5 cri +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
β6 sysi β7 marketcapj β8 level3i γ X εi+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
SF_Yi
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For the country-specific variables, we consider stock exchange market capitaliza-
tion over nominal GDP (marketcap). Our goal is to control for a market disci-
pline effect that may substitute supervisory scrutiny. Our hypothesis is that an
economy with a well-developed financial market should be characterized by
lower AQR and ST shortfalls because the market has already imposed on banks
adequate capitalization/risk management tools.
We complete our analysis by inserting two further explicative variables. The
dummy variable Drestruct takes a value equal to 1 in the case of a bank under-
going a restructuring process before 31 December 2013 and 0 otherwise: a
restructuring plan for a bank is usually accompanied by tougher activity by the
supervisory authority, deleveraging/cleaning of the books and public or private
capital injections. We also include the dummy variable Dirb (which takes a value
equal to 1 in the case of a bank with more than 50% of its RWAs computed
according to the internal rating model) to check whether banks use the discretion
of Basel II/III agreements to reduce RWAs (see e.g. Mariathasan and Merrouche,
2014).
We estimate (1) using a Tobit estimator, which overcomes the problem of incon-
sistent results derived from using the ordinary least squares estimator when the
dependent variable is truncated (see Wooldridge, 2002).
Let us stress that according to the Basel II/III framework, if regulatory and super-
visory activities work properly, then the CET1 ratio should provide exhaustive
information about the soundness of the bank while other indicators should be
redundant.
The reference model is estimated and the results are reported in Table 1, p. 100.
As expected, we find that a high CET1 ratio negatively affects the shortfall of the
AQR (model I).
However, considering SF_CA, the relationship is not confirmed. It seems that the
CET1 ratio was considered a reliable capital indicator by national authorities and
the ECB during the AQR, but that it was not able to capture adequately the risks
of a bank and therefore the shortfall of the CA is not negatively affected by the
CET1 ratio (models V and VI). On the other hand, the leverage ratio turns out to
be always highly significant (models III, IV, VII and VIII): leveraged banks (low
ratio) are characterized by higher capital shortfalls. In contrast to the general
paradigm of the Basel II/III regulation, grounded on risk-adjusted capital ratios,
this evidence signals that the CA’s capital shortfalls are mainly driven by the lever-
age ratio.
As far as bank size is concerned, we observe an inverted U shape: the SF_AQR
and SF_CA of medium-sized banks are higher than the shortfalls for small and
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Table 1. Regression results – reference model for capital shortfall.
The table reports the estimation results based on the Tobit estimator.
Model
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Dependent variable SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_CA SF_CA SF_CA SF_CA
cet1 -0.098*** -0.099*** - - -0.071 -0.079 - -
[0.027] [0.020] [0.046] [0.049]
lr - - -0.188*** -0.194*** - - -0.617*** -0.652***
[0.059] [0.057] [0.148] [0.143] 
lasset 0.615*** 0.786** 0.873 1.143** 1.750** 1.841** 1.574 1.663
[0.188] [0.343] [0.605] [0.560] [0.805] [0.872] [0.987] [1.089] 
lasset2 -0.060** -0.082 -0.130 -0.174** -0.195** -0.222** -0.200 -0.229
[0.025] [0.052] [0.094] [0.083] [0.098] [0.110] [0.123] [0.142] 
npe 0.021** 0.031*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.153*** 0.160***
[0.009] [0.011] [0.012] [0.018] [0.035] [0.036] [0.033] [0.031] 
cr -0.010* -0.019*** -0.012* -0.022** -0.020** -0.020* 0.006 0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] 
sys -0.005* -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.013 -0.019* -0.016** -0.023***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.009] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] 
marketcap -0.010** -0.018*** -0.016** -0.024*** -0.026** -0.034** -0.038*** -0.050***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.014] [0.010] [0.013] 
level3 -0.087 -0.149* -0.044 -0.057 0.057 0.041 0.019 -0.030
[0.071] [0.079] [0.059] [0.067] [0.129] [0.126] [0.112] [0.110] 
Drestruct - 0.696*** - 0.737*** - 1.041* - 1.207** 
[0.234] [0.273] [0.592] [0.518] 
Dirb - -0.196* - -0.216 - 0.255 - 0.085
[0.099] [0.152] [0.496] [0.396] 
constant -0.082 0.135 -0.214 -0.047 -2.768 -2.515 -0.533 -0.026
[0.359] [0.546] [1.013] [1.077] [1.775] [1.977] [1.904] [2.048] 
sigma 0.279*** 0.206*** 0.404*** 0.357*** 1.338*** 1.287*** 1.020*** 0.933***
[0.068] [0.029] [0.071] [0.053] [0.255] [0.236] [0.159] [0.117] 
F statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.000
Uncensored obs 16 16 16 16 25 25 25 25
Obs 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. We use Stata11 for all calculations.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance of the parameters at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels respectively.
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large banks. The fact that large banks were not penalized by the CA is confirmed
by the negative and significant coefficient associated with the variable capturing
the systemic nature of the bank (sys). We can interpret this evidence as showing
that the supervisors are captive to large banks. However, it may be the case that
large banks are able to evaluate their assets more carefully or possibly were
subject to greater supervision in the past due to the ‘too big to fail’ problem.
The role of financial markets can be easily understood: a well-developed financial
market (represented by the variable marketcap) negatively affects both SF_AQR
and SF_CA. This result illustrates the role of market supervision (Basel II’s third
pillar), which complements the activity of the supervisory authority (Basel II’s
second pillar).
Looking at the composition of the balance sheet, credit activity and financial
assets play a different role. On the one hand, we observe that the shortfall is
inflated by the ratio of non-performing loans, representing an indicator of the
quality of credit: lower quality (higher ratio) induces a more significant shortfall;
a phenomenon partially balanced by a high coverage ratio that negatively affects
the shortfall (weakly in the case of the CA as a whole). On the other hand,
surprisingly, the proportion of level 3 assets over total assets does not affect the
shortfall of either the AQR or the CA: this outcome signals that the CA fails to
capture higher risks related to illiquid and complex financial activities.
Taking into account the additional explanatory variables with respect to the refer-
ence model, we find first that the role of restructuring plans (Drestruct) is signif-
icant and robust as the specification varies: a bank under restructuring is charac-
terized by a higher shortfall of the AQR and of the CA as a whole. Second, the
coefficient associated with the dummy variable measuring whether a bank relies
on the internal rating approach (Dirb) is rarely statistical significant: we can
deduce that according to the CA, the adoption of the internal-based model is not
associated with risk weight manipulation.
Looking at the overall fitness of the models, we find that the standard error of the
regression (sigma) is the lowest when the CET1 ratio is included with the SF_
AQR as the dependent variable (model II), while the best fit for the SF_CA is
obtained by including the leverage ratio (model VIII).
We also develop our analysis comparing banks by country of origin. The CA
exercise was followed by a dispute about the possibility that the ECB adopted
double standards with respect to banks depending on their country of origin; to
address this point, we provide some regressions considering among the exoge-
nous variables a dummy variable (Dcore), which assumes a value equal to 1 in
the case that a bank is incorporated in one of the core countries (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and 0 otherwise
(peripheral countries). In Table 2 we provide some regressions for SF_AQR.
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Table 2. Regression results – Core vs non-core country effects on capital shortfall 
in the AQR.
The table reports the estimation results based on the Tobit estimator.
Dependent variable: SF_AQR
Model
I II III IV V VI
cet1 -0.092*** - - -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.100***
[0.018] [0.017] [0.014] [0.016] 
lasset 0.773** 0.759** 1.166** 0.754** 0.908*** 0.613** 
[0.328] [0.323] [0.509] [0.290] [0.332] [0.284] 
lasset2 -0.080 -0.078 -0.181** -0.078* -0.103** -0.051
[0.050] [0.050] [0.077] [0.044] [0.052] [0.043] 
sys -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
marketcap -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.025** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.022***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
Drestruct 0.804*** 1.039*** 0.806** 0.909*** 1.017*** 0.929***
[0.223] [0.155] [0.406] [0.157] [0.185] [0.141] 
Dirb -0.201 -0.254*** -0.093 -0.196* -0.163 -0.328***
[0.126] [0.081] [0.193] [0.103] [0.105] [0.092] 
1-Dcore 0.410*** -2.397*** -0.092 -0.447* -0.830* -0.197
[0.147] [0.809] [0.960] [0.248] [0.433] [0.165] 
npe 0.025** 0.018** 0.054*** - 0.019** 0.021***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.016] [0.008] [0.008] 
cr -0.028*** -0.006 -0.027 -0.008 - -0.020***
[0.009] [0.008] [0.019] [0.006] [0.006] 
level3 -0.232** -0.170** -0.114 -0.165** -0.154** -0.221***
[0.090] [0.075] [0.188] [0.071] [0.076] [0.079] 
cet1×Dcore - -0.398*** - - - -
[0.089]
cet1×(1-Dcore) - -0.103*** - - - -
[0.014]
lr×Dcore - - -0.419** - - -
[0.203]
lr×(1-Dcore) - - -0.157*** - - -
[0.050]
npe×Dcore - - - -27.057*** - -
[7.951]
npe×(1-Dcore) - - - 1.849** - -
[0.736]
cr×Dcore - - - - -4.618*** -
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We consider the variable 1-Dcore (Model I) and then we interact it with five
different exogenous variables: i) CET1 ratio; ii) leverage ratio; iii) non-perform-
ing exposure; iv) coverage ratio; v) systemic risk indicator (models II to VI). To
check whether the effect of core countries is statistically different from that of
non-core ones, we report the Wald test for the equality of the coefficients. We also
report the derivative of the five exogenous variables evaluated at the median
value for the two different groups of countries.
First we observe that the effect of the 1-Dcore variable, without interactions, on
the shortfall of the AQR is positive and significant (model I). Then we notice that
the coefficients of some exogenous variables (cet1, npe, cr and sys) interacted
[0.819]
cr×(1-Dcore) - - - - -0.359 -
[0.898]
sys×Dcore - - - - - -0.135***
[0.029] 
sys×(1-Dcore) - - - - - -0.011***
[0.003] 
constant 0.205 2.548*** 0.311 0.639 0.672* 0.904* 
[0.468] [0.565] [1.021] [0.404] [0.401] [0.469] 
Sigma 0.183*** 0.160*** 0.337*** 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.162***
[0.025] [0.026] [0.048] [0.024] [0.025] [0.027] 
βDcore = β(1-Dcore) (p-value) - 0.001 0.172 0.000 0.002 0.000
- -5.518*** -1.773** -58.026*** -189.6*** -3.523***
- -3.542*** -1.054 18.775** -16.382 -0.552***
F statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Uncensored obs 16 16 16 16 16 16
Obs 129 129 129 129 129 129
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. We use Stata11 for all calculations.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance of the parameters at the 10%, 5% and 1% signifi-
cance levels respectively. Derivatives are evaluated at the median value of the Z control variable
interacted with Dcore and (1-Dcore).
Table 2. Regression results – Core vs non-core country effects on capital shortfall 
in the AQR.
The table reports the estimation results based on the Tobit estimator.
Dependent variable: SF_AQR
Model
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with Dcore and 1-Dcore are statistically different. In absolute values, the coeffi-
cients associated with banks incorporated in core countries are higher than the
coefficients associated with banks incorporated in non-core countries. A high
CET1 ratio (model II) for a bank of a core country negatively affects the shortfall
more than in the case of a bank of a peripheral country. With respect to non-
performing exposures, we find that the effect is positive and significant in the case
of peripheral countries, while it is negative and significant for core countries
(model IV). Confirming this evaluation, the effect of the coverage ratio in core
countries is negative and significant, while in peripheral countries it is not signif-
icant (model V). Finally, we notice that the systemic risk indicator associated with
a large bank implies a milder impact for credit institutions operating in core coun-
tries than for those located in peripheral ones (model VI).
These results can be interpreted in two different ways: either as a signal of
‘favour’ (severity) of country regulators in peripheral (core) countries before the
CA exercise, or as evidence that the AQR was benevolent (tough) towards banks
incorporated in core (non-core) countries.
11.3. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of the CA raised a number of questions related to the fact that it was
not neutral. In particular, two issues were widely discussed: i) the CA was biased
towards traditional credit activity; ii) banks located in peripheral countries were
penalized.
The analysis of the shortfall of the CA provided in this paper highlights that some
factors affect the shortfall besides the CET1 ratio starting point: i) banks located
in non-core countries were penalized by the AQR; ii) medium-sized banks are
either more risky or were penalized by the CA; iii) poor credit quality and credit
specialization are the main balance sheet features driving the shortfall, while the
proportion of assets that it is difficult to evaluate plays no role. Moreover, we find
that the CET1 ratio is significant in explaining the shortfall of the AQR, but not
in explaining the shortfall of the CA.
However, the leverage ratio is always significant: a less leveraged bank would
experience a lower shortfall.
These results provide three interesting policy insights. First of all, the analysis
shows that the leverage ratio constraint introduced by the Basel III regulation is
a better indicator of financial soundness than the classic risk-weighted capital
ratio. As the actual Basel III calibration of the leverage ratio is soft (see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015), the suggestion is to set a sharper
constraint on the leverage ratio. The second implication is that the European
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Banking Union marks an important step in harmonizing the banking sector at the
European level considering that the national regulatory/supervisory standards
were quite heterogeneous before the CA. However, our analysis shows that the
ECB’s supervision activity needs refinement as it is overly concentrated on tradi-
tional activity with a limited focus on the evaluation of financial assets. As the
financial crisis has shown that complex assets evaluated according to a model
may be a source of instability, a tougher approach by the ECB towards these
assets seems necessary. Considering all these aspects, some doubts emerge about
the ability of the CA to be really comprehensive. From this perspective, the Super-
visory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), promoted by the EBA and ECB
from 1 January 2016, seems to be a useful step as the experience of the Federal
Reserve (2015) suggests.
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